A Theory of Justice

The first stage of moral development is the morality of authority. Young members of society acquire a sense of justice gradually as they age, first from their parents and then later from other authority figures.

This authority is based in love. Children are initially motivated by rational self-interest and develop love for their parents by bonding with them over the gradual development of their own self-worth. Parental norms are constraints against which children rebel, but the love and trust children feel for their parents dispose them to eventually share their sentiments towards their transgressions.

The morality of authority in larger social arrangements can only be justified in unusual circumstances, when it is determined essential for certain individuals to have such authority, and the scope of such authority is always determined by the principles of justice.

The second stage of moral development is the morality of association. The morality of association is based upon “the moral standards appropriate to the individual’s role in the various associations to which [they] belong” (409). The ideals conferred are suited to specific roles typically understood in increasing fashion as a person’s life progresses, requiring increasingly greater moral and intellectual judgment understood in the context of the association from which the morals are derived, i.e., from social cooperation and trust. Guilt acts as a motivator for people to perform their roles if they have established bonds of mutual respect and trust with other members of their group.

The third stage of moral development is the morality of principles. In this stage, higher-order principles such as the conception of acting justly and advancing just institutions become equally attractive to a person as the moralities of authority and association. The morality of association leads to a knowledge of the principles of justice. A sense of justice instills itself in an individual through the acceptance of applicable benefit conferring just institutions, and by fostering a desire to construct just institutions and reform existing unjust institutions. At this point, a morality of principles is accepted, and moral attitudes are a conception of right shaped by principles, rather than the approval of individuals and associations.

This section discusses the concept of a moral sentiment, the nature of the three psychological laws, and the process by which they take hold. The term “sentiment” in this sense describes both permanent ordered families of governing dispositions (moral sentiments) and lasting attachments to individuals and associations (natural sentiments). The term “attitudes” describes less regulative and enduring ordered families of dispositions. A “moral feeling” or “moral emotion” is simply a feeling or emotion experienced that invokes a moral concept and its associated principles; that is, one that references a right or wrong. Moral feelings are distinguished from one another by the principles they invoke, though one action may trigger several moral feelings.

Natural attitudes and moral sentiments are overlapping, ordered families of characteristic dispositions. A person’s natural attachments lead to moral emotions once they reach a stage of development permitting such. Conversely, the absence of moral feelings evidences the absence of natural attachments, and “[e]ither one without the other would be equally unusual” (427). Because moral feelings are based in natural attitudes, they are a part of humanity and the two principles of justice and would be consented to in the original position.

The three principles of moral psychology are those explained in Sections 70-72. They are a useful simplification. A more robust account would distinguish between instrumental condition and classical condition, and in doing so address emotions and feelings. Such a detailed account is not necessary for the two principles of justice as fairness. The principles of morality are reciprocal principles of attachment to individuals, associations, and institutions that influence the theory of moral learning, the acceptance or rejection of institutions, and the decisions of political actors. The principles also regulate persons’ chains of decision-making that result in their final ends.

To be stable, a just scheme of cooperation must be in equilibrium. The reciprocal relation between the three psychological laws stabilizes a society regulated by a public sense of justice. Such a society is inherently stable, and its stability increases with time. Therefore, “justice as fairness is a reasonably stable moral conception” (436): “The most stable conception of justice, therefore, is presumably one that is perspicuous to our reason, congruent with our good, and rooted not in abnegation but in affirmation of the self” (436).

The basis of equality is “the features of human beings in virtue of which they are to be treated in accordance with the principles of justice” (441). The concept of equality applies to the administration of institutions as public systems of rules, the substantive structure of institutions, and to moral persons who are entitled to equal justice.

Applied to institutions as public systems of rules, equality ensures that such rules treat similar cases similarly. Equality governs the substantive structure of institutions by requiring equal rights be assigned to all persons. Equality finally establishes that the capacity for moral personality is a sufficient condition for equal justice. A person’s lesser capacity for a sense of justice does not justify depriving that person of justice: “Once a certain minimum is met, a person is entitled to equal liberty on par with everyone else” (443). For those who have not yet realized a capacity for justice (children) or those who have lost their realized capacity (mental illness), the principle of paternalism dictates that other persons should afford them a sense of justice that accords with what the incapacitated would have agreed to in the original position.

The two conceptions of equality can now be reconciled:

Equality of the first kind is defined by the second principle of justice which regulates the structure of organizations and distributive shares so that social cooperation is both efficient and fair. But equality of the second kind is fundamental. It is defined by the first principle of justice and by such natural duties as that of mutual respect; it is owed to human beings as moral persons (447).