The Rape of Nanking

Given the enormity of the violence perpetrated by Japanese soldiers during the Nanking massacre, it is difficult to offer sufficient explanations regarding how such brutality came about. Nevertheless, the author identifies a series of currents in early 20th-century Japanese culture and society that contributed to the behavior of its soldiers.

The first was the bushido code of the samurai which dates back to the Middle Ages. In characterizing the key tenets of this warrior code, the author writes, “To die in the service of one’s lord was the greatest honor a samurai warrior could achieve in his lifetime” (19). While this explains the courage of the Japanese soldier, it does not necessarily explain his viciousness against the Chinese. That brutality comes down to the divide between Japan’s bushido-influenced army and China’s less feudal attitudes toward war. For example, when Azuma saw thousands of surrendered Chinese troops who outnumbered his own platoon, he was filled with contempt. In his memoir, he writes, “How could they become prisoners, with the kind of force they had—more than two battalions—and without even trying to show any resistance” (43). This contempt, the author writes, was a key factor in precipitating the imminent slaughter of the surrendered Chinese soldiers.

Another major factor was the rigid and divine hierarchy in Imperial Japan that centered about Emperor Hirohito. For the soldiers, the “lord” the bushido code required them to protect was Hirohito. Furthermore, the societal structure of Imperial Japan designated importance according to one’s proximity to the emperor. A lowly solder like Azuma was taught that his life was worth virtually nothing outside of protecting the emperor. Yet if his life was meaningless, the life of a foreigner like the Chinese meant infinitely less. Thus, Japanese soldiers viewed the enemy, civilian and soldier alike, as less than human, and they therefore treated the Chinese accordingly during the Nanking massacre. The author characterizes this sense of dehumanization as part of the “transfer of oppression” (217) that took place as Japanese soldiers, abused by their superiors, passed that abuse on to the Chinese.

Finally, according to widespread attitudes shared across Japanese society, Japan and its emperor possessed a divine right to conquer Asia. In this view, doing so would ultimately benefit conquered nations like China, and as a result atrocities were cast in a more favorable light by those who perpetrated them. This perspective is perhaps best encapsulated by Matsui, whom the author quotes as saying, “We must regard this struggle as a method of making the Chinese undergo self-reflection. We do not do this because we hate them, but on the contrary we love them too much” (219).